Abstract-Information-theoretic performance limits of digital fingerprinting systems subject to almost-sure squared-error distortion constraints on the fingerprint embedder and the colluders are derived in this paper. The rate of the fingerprinting code is R = -t, log M where N is codelength and M is the number of users. No assumption is made on the host signal statistics, but the collusion channel is also subject to a location-invariant condition. The receiver knows neither the collusion channel nor even the number of colluders. Capacity is the supremum of achievable rates and is shown to be equal to 2~ log( 1 + :It) where K is the number of colluders, and D£ and Dc are the £2-distortion tolerance levels for the fingerprint embedder and the colluders, respectively. The worst collusion is shown to consist of uniform linear averaging of the coalition's marked copies followed by addition of independent spherical noise. Positive error exponents are achieved at all rates below capacity using random spherical fingerprinting codes and a new universal decoding criterion based on empirical Gaussian mutual information. It is also shown that minimum-distance decoding fails for this problem, and that a simple single-user decoder is almost as good as the universal decoder for large K. Geometric interpretations for all the results are given.
I. INTRODUCTION
Digital fingerprinting systems can be used for traitor tracing or digital rights management applications. A length-N realvalued signal is to be protected and distributed to M users. Some of the users (K of them) may collude and process their copies to create a pirated copy that contains only weak traces of their fingerprints. This problem was first posed by Cox et al. [1] who proposed the use of Gaussian fingerprints for this purpose. Specifically, their fingerprints were i.i.d. (independent and identically distributed) Gaussian sequences; the fingerprint code is shared with the decoder but not revealed to the users.
A fundamental question is what are the optimal performance limits for detection of colluders. To make the problem nontrivial, one may assume embedding distortion constraints on the fingerprinter and the colluders. Examples of this analysis include [2] - [4] for the case of signals defined over finite alphabets, and [5] , [6] for the case of real-valued signals.
Ying Wang Qualcomm Flarion Technologies
Bridgewater, NJ 08807, USA Email: yingw@qualcomm.com
In the latter case, an obvious (but not necessarily optimal) strategy for the colluders is to perform a uniform linear average of their copies and add i.i.d. Gaussian noise; this strategy was examined in the above papers. Possible improvements for the attackers consist of developing (nonlinear) order-statistics attacks [7] , as illustrated by numerical simulations [8] . The papers [5] - [8] did not establish whether stronger attacks or better decoders might exist.
An information-theoretic analysis of universal fingerprinting over finite alphabets was recently reported in [4] . The decoder has access to a pirated copy as well as to the host signal (nonblind detection) and returns a list of accused users. The decoder knows neither the collusion channel nor even the number of colluders. The cost functions are the false-positive and false-negative error probabilities, which should vanish for any admissible collusion strategy. The same universal fingerprinting setup is assumed in this paper. However the random coding techniques of [4] rely on the method of types and are not applicable here. A different approach is therefore needed. An extended version of this paper containing the proofs will be presented in [9] . Notation. Throughout this paper, we use boldface uppercase letters to denote random vectors, and uppercase letters for the components of the vectors. Mathematical expectation is denoted by the symbol IE. The shorthands a N ~ bN and aN ~ bN denote asymptotic relations in the exponential scale, respectively limN-+co tt log ~ = 0 and
The Euclidean norm of a vector x is denoted by Ilxll = 
II. PROBLEM STATEMENT
The mathematical setup of the problem is diagrammed in Fig. 1 .
A. Fingerprint Generation and Embedding
The host signal is a sequence S = (8(1), ... , 8(N)) in ~N, viewed as deterministic but unknown to the colluders. Fingerprints are added to S, and the marked copies of the signal are distributed to 2NR users. Specifically, user m is assigned a marked copy Xm = S + U m where m E {I, ... , 2NR} ~ MN, and U m E ~N is the fingerprint assigned to user m. The fingerprints are randomized by means of a random variable V shared between encoder and decoder but unknown to the colluders. The random variable V is independent of Sand m, and the dependency of U m on V is not indicated explicitly. The encoding function takes the form Xm = fN(S,m, V).
The fingerprints Um, m E MN form a (N,2NR) fingerprinting code C of rate R. In a typical signal fingerprinting application, N rv 10 3 -10 9 and 2N R < 10 9 (not to exceed the number of humans).
Fingerprints must satisfy the distortion constraint IIUm l 1 2 :::
where Dr is the mean-squared distortion due to embedding.
As we shall see, only two kinds of randomization are needed here. The first ~ rand0!!lized rotation of a prototype fingerprint constellation C = {Um' m E MN} via a parameter e that is uniformly distributed over the special orthonormal 
B. Attack Model
Denote by /C ~ MN the coalition, i.e., the index set of the colluding users. Their coalition has cardinality K. They select a conditional pdf PYlxx:, termed the collusion channel. Then they draw a pirated copy Y E ~ N from that distribution. Consider the following constraints on the collusion channel. for all permutations 1r of the index set /C.
(1)
The constraint (AI) precludes attacks involving filtering of host signal components. The motivation for this restriction is that it considerably simplifies the mathematical derivation and does not require a statistical model for the host S. The restriction is relatively mild if embedding is done in a transform domain in which the components of the host S are approximately independent and are large relative to the embedding distortion. The motivation for (A2) is that distortion is best measured relative to the host S, but S is not known to the coalition, so we replace S by its best linear unbiased estimate, X. Choosing an expected distortion constraint of the form JEllY -SI1 2 :::; NDc would allow impulsive noise strategies which blast independent and identically distributed (Li.d.) additive noise N(O, N Dc) with probability liN. Such attacks are extremely effective [12] as they result in zero error exponents. Finally, the fairness condition (A3) will not be imposed but holds for optimal attacks [4, Prop. 2.4] . All members of the coalition incur the same risk. The constraints (AI) and (A2) define a class 1I'K of feasible collusion channels. That class is convex and permutation-invariant. The subset of 1I'K consisting of the collusion channels that satisfy (A3) will be denoted by 1I'k air • A collusion channel that will be of interest is (2) where the noise E is independent of XIC and uniformly distributed on the centered sphere with radius v' N Dc. (Note that if the attackers can retrieve the original signal S, they will succeed in defeating the decoder.) The attack of (2) satisfies the requirements (AI)-(A3).
C. Decoder
We study the nonblind scenario where the host signal S is available at the decoder. The decoder input is (Y, S, e, 1r) and its output is an estimated coalition where 9 N is the decoding function for the prototype code C. Let 15m be the prototype code's decoding region for user m, i.e.,
The decoder does not know the channel PYlxx: used by the colluders or even the exact number K of colluders.
D. Performance Metrics
As detailed in [4] , there are three basic error probabilities of interest: the probability PFP of false positives (accusing one or more innocent users), the probability p: ll of failing to catch all colluders, and the probability p~ne of failing to catch even one colluder. By our location-invariant assumption on the attack channel and the decoding regions, these error probabilities are independent of s. Since user assignments are randomly permuted, these probabilities are also independent of /C. Their dependency on the code (f N , 9 N) and the collusion channel PYlxx: is indicated explicitly as follows: For a sequence of randomized codes (f N, gN), the error exponents are defined as
where E represents the random coding exponent E FP , Eo ne , or Eall. Moreover, Eall(R, Dr, 1f/K) :::; Eone(R, Dr, 1f/K) because an error event for the detect-one problem is also an error event for the detect-all problem. We have Eall = 0 if the class 1f/ K includes channels in which one colluder can "stay out," i.e., not contribute to the pirated copy.
III. SPHERICALLY SYMMETRIC COLLUSION CHANNEL
Lemma 1: For any fingerprinting code with randomized rotation e, there is no loss of optimality for the colluders in choosing a spherically symmetric collusion channel:
Hence for the error probability analyses in this paper, we assume without loss of generality that a spherically symmetric collusion channel is used. Moreover it follows from (AI) that there is no loss of generality in assuming S = O. Thus Xm = U m for each m, and we refer to X m, m E MN as the fingerprints in the sequel.
IV. MUTUAL-INFORMATION GAME
Fingerprinting capacity was obtained in [4] as the value of a mutual-information game. When S = 0, capacity takes the form
where W plays the role of a time-sharing random variable, and the joint distribution of (W, X K, Y) is given by 
p(W,xK,y) =pw(w) (IIpx,w(XkIW)) PYIXK(ylxK).
While (3) was derived under the assumption of discrete alphabets, modifications of the proof can be made to extend the applicability of the formula to the case of abstract alphabets. In this section we solve the maxmin problem of (6) and derive a simple formula in terms of the number of colluders, K, and the distortion levels Dr and Dc for the fingerprint embedder and colluders.
Let Px be the Gaussian pdf with mean 0 and variance Dr, and PYIXK the conditional Gaussian pdf with mean -1 " . X = K uk Xk and varIance Dc.
Theorem 2: The solution to the maxmin game of (3) is given by C(K) = 2~ log (I + :~J (6) and is achieved by
Note that the time-sharing random variable is degenerate here. This is in contrast with discrete-alphabet problems such as the Boney-Shaw problem with binary alphabet where the presence of W makes an important difference [4, Sec. 3] .
V. LIMITATIONS OF MINIMUM-DISTANCE DECODING
One of the difficulties with fingerprinting is that the number of colluders is unknown to the encoder and decoder. For simplicity we assume in this section that the colluders use the averaging plus additive white Gaussian noise (A WGN) attack:
1,", - 
This would coincide with the maximum likelihood (ML) decoding rule if K were known and the minimization over coalitions K of size K. In conventional decoding problems, the ML decoder minimizes error probability and is therefore optimal. Since K is unknown here, (7) is a generalized ML decoding rule, which may be severely suboptimal. IN~rXk.XI-:n.{k=l}I:::;E' Vk,lEK'. (9) The set of coalitions K' that satisfy (9) will be denoted by X(E). By convention, the empty coalition 0 E X(E).
It may be verified that this decoder is plagued by false positives because K is unknown and unbounded. No positive rates are achievable.
However, if a maximum coalition size K max is given to the decoder, all rates below C(Kmax) are achievable. Still, the decoder would fail if the coalition size is K < K max and the code rate satisfies C(Kmax) < R < C(K). This decoder
• does not adapt to the actual coalition size; • does not provide a tradeoff between false positives and false negatives;
• rejects any slightly atypical coalition K 1-X ( E) from consideration, hence its error exponents are zero. 
Lemma 3: The mutual information of L jointly Gaussian random variables UI,··· , UL, is given by (12) where R is the L x L matrix of normalized correlation coefficients whose entries are
The matrix R will be henceforth termed the normalizedo correlation matrix. Note that IG(U1;··· ; UL) is invariant to scalings of the individual random variables Uk, and that (10) is a special case of (12) with L = 2.
Empirical Mutual informations. Given two sequences x and y defined over discrete alphabets, the empirical mutual information between x and y is defined as the mutual information with respect to the empirical joint distribution (joint type) of x and y. The empirical mutual information of L random variables is also defined with respect to their joint type. This definition does not admit a natural extension to the case of continuous alphabets, so we follow a different path.
Given two sequences x and y in ~ N, the normalized empirical correlation coefficient between x and y is defined as p(x, y) = IIxll"Wyll. Likewise, the empirical correlation between two sequences x and y is defined as C;;(x,y) = tJx. y. The empirical correlation matrix C;;(Ul,··· , UL) for L sequences UI,··· ,UL is the L x L matrix whose (j, k) element is given by C;;(Uj, Uk). The empirical normalized correlation matrix is defined as R = {p(Uj, Uk)}]:k=l. 
VII. DECODERS
We consider three decoders: a simple (single-user) thresholding decoder, a joint decoder that achieves positive error exponents at all rates below capacity, and a simplified capacityachieving joint decoder based on typicality (this decoder has zero error exponents).
A. Thresholding Decoder
The simple decoder outputs the estimated coalition JC that consists of all user indices m such that ----
C. M PG M I Joint Decoder
A simple approximation to R in (19) can be obtained based on the fact that p( Xj, Xk) is equal to 1 for j = k and converges in probability to zero for j #-k, as N --+ 00. Write
mEK which converges in probability to 1 -LmEK p2(Xm, Y).
We will thus consider a simplified decoder based on the approximation (21). Plugging this approximation into (20), we obtain the criterion 
where Itl+ ~ max{t,O}, Ecap(P) ~ -! 10g(I -p2), and 
Moreover, under (A3), Eall(R,.6.., K) = Eone(R,.6.., K). The supremum of the rates for which these error exponents are positive is 1 (
and is achieved by letting .6.. 
Then as N ---> 00.
In the special case L = 2, the determinant IRI = 1 -R~2' Given any Xl E SN -1, the constraint Xl . X2 = R12 defines a hyperplane whose intersection with S N -1 is a N -1 sphere of radius VI -R~2' centered at R12X1. The proof of the lemma generalizes this geometric approach.
Corollary 7: Define the following subset of the L-fold
Cartesian product of S N -1 :
This follows from Lemma 6 and the compactness of the set of normalized correlation matrices. The result is analogous to Sanov's theorem in large-deviations theory [14] . 
Any constellation with the same mean vector length IIXlI = following error exponents: By analogy with the case K = 2, it will be useful to think of 0 :::; fL < 1/,jR and 1/,jR < fL :::; 1 as corresponding to "negatively correlated" and "positively correlated" fingerprints, respectively. As we shall see, positively correlated fingerprints are easier to decode than negatively correlated fingerprints. The case K = 3, fL > 1/ J3 is depicted in Fig. 2 . • the supremum of all R for which the error exponents are positive is C(K) in (6) and is achieved by letting tl. --t 0;
• for any fair coalition, Eall(R, tl., K) = Eone(R, tl., K).
The false-negative exponent formula (37) may be interpreted by viewing the error event as the intersection of two events: (I) the colluders' fingerprints XK may be correlated, in which case the length fL of the mean vector x differs from the typical value 1/,jR; and (2) the component of the noise vector w along the direction of x is significant. Each of these two events has exponentially vanishing probability, and each exponent is a function of fL. The minimand in (37) is the sum of these two exponents, and the typical value of IIXlI for the error event is the minimizing fL. This minimizing value is below 1/,jR, i.e., the fingerprints are negatively correlated.
To illustrate this analysis, consider a fingerprinting system with 2 20 ("-' one million) users and a target false-positive error probability of 2-12 ~ 10-4 . Hence N R = 20 and N tl. = 12.
These requirements are met using a random spherical fingerprinting code of approximate length N = 20,000 and rate R = 10-3 , and fixing our universal decoder's parameter at tl. = 6 X 10-4 . The error exponents (36) and (37) are plotted as a function of K in Fig. 3 The minimizing values of fL in (37) when K = 2 and K = 34 are equal to fL = 0.6975 and fL = 0.1715, respectively. Equivalently, fL,jR = 0.9865 and 0.99998, respectively. In both cases, the minimizing fL is close to the typical value. ----
X. ANALYSIS OF M PGM I DECODER ----
The M PGM I decoder is capacity-achieving. However its false-negative error exponent is zero because it limits its search to typical coalitions. 
XI. LARGE COALITIONS
Comparing C1(K) = ! log (1 + Dc K2 +-'E f (K-l)) of (27) with C(K) = 21-log (1 + :1>;) of (6), we observe that both asymptotically approach 2(ln [>1<2 Dc from below as K -+ 00.
Hence, for large K, the simp(e decoder is nearly as good as the more complex joint decoder.
XII. DISCUSSION Closed-form solutions have been obtained for the capacity and random-coding exponents of a fingerprinting system subject to almost-sure squared distortion constraints. This study extends recent work presented in [4] for finite alphabets. Here the decoding metric is based on the determinant of the empirical normalized correlation matrix. The encoder and decoder do not need to know anything about the collusion channel and the coalition size K. Note that in the finitealphabet case [4] , the encoder needs to assume a nominal value for the coalition size, and a time-sharing random variable is used.
